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I. INTRODUCTION
The Secretary of Interior, through the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), is charged with managing more than 170 million acres of federal
public rangelands throughout the western United States.' Livestock
grazing is authorized on approximately 150 million of these acres.' Prior to
the enactment of grazing legislation, livestock grazing on federal public
lands was virtually unregulated, resulting in extreme overgrazing and
resource deterioration. Upon realizing the extent of the problem, Congress
enacted a series of statutes directed at rangeland improvement. The three
primary legislative directives governing BLM policies are the Taylor
Grazing Act,' the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 4
and the Public Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA).5 These acts provide
policies mandating improvement of the federal public rangelands.
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, a 1985 decision
addressing federal rangeland legislation, a Nevada federal district court
upheld the modest land use plan proposed by the BLM, stating that the
plan satisfied Congressional policies of rangeland improvement.' Although
the land use plan did suggest some long term improvements, it did not
advance the immediate action necessary to prevent overgrazing and
environmental degradation.8 This casenote examines the Hodel district
court decision, addressing thejudiciary's role in reviewing BLM's land use
plans under the present federal rangeland statutes. The Taylor Grazing
Act, FLPMA and PRIA, the three major statutes addressing range
management, are first reviewed in Part II of this casenote. Part III
examines the factual and legal history of the Hodel decision and Part IV
I. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC LAND STATISTIcs 21 (1975). Federal public land is
located primarily in Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
2. Id.
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
4. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
5. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1982).
6. 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985), affrd, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987). The decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was issued after this casenote was completed. Consequently,
this casenote only addresses the federal district court decision.
7. 624 F. Supp. at 1058.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 69-86.
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analyzes this decision in light of the facts and other court decisions. Part V
concludes with a perspective on the court's role in reviewing a BLM
proposed land use plan.
II. FEDERAL POLICIES AND STATUTES DIRECTING PUBLIC
RANGELAND MANAGEMENT
A. The Taylor Grazing Act
Prior to 1934, neither federal nor state governments seriously at-
tempted to limit livestock overgrazing which contributed to the arid and
deteriorating range condition.9 Three historic developments, illustrating
the condition of the land prior to 1934, helped to shape the present statute.
First, the federal government's erratic methods of disposition10 of the
federal public lands to private and state hands led to instances of fraud,
ownership fragmentation, and resource deterioration. 1 Second, the lack of
effective legal constraints allowed powerful ranchers to deny other inter-
ested parties, homesteaders for instance, access to federal public range-
lands. These actions by the powerful ranchers often resulted in range war
brushfires.' 2 Finally, the rise of conservation, first recognized in connection
with national parks and forest policies, eventually succeeded the federal
government's disposition policy and became reflected in the management
of the nation's rangelands."3 In response to these three developments,
Congress enacted the Taylor Grazing Act 4 as the first comprehensive
legislation regulating federal public rangeland management.
The major goals of the Taylor Grazing Act (Act) were improvement
of range conditions and stabilization of the western livestock industry. 5 To
accomplish these goals, the Act reasserted federal control of the federal
public domain. The Secretary of Interior was delegated authority to
classify land as suitable for homesteading or other disposal," to organize
9. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The Extent and Distribution of
Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 548-49 (1982).
10. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management 1k. The Commons and the Taylor Act,
13 ENVTL. L. 1,4 (1982). Congress rapidly disposed of federal public lands to state and private hands in
patterns which still impede coherent land management. For example, states received an enormous
amount of federal public lands, though arbitrarily interspersed among private lands. Railroad grants
still obstruct integrated land management because of "checkerboard" ownership sections with public
lands. Also, through various disposition laws, homesteaders received limited amounts of land; yet,
Congress often liberalized policies to accommodate the homesteaders' desires for more land. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r.
15. Id. § 315a.
16. Id. § 315f.
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the land into grazing districts,1 7 and to make all rules, regulations and
agreements necessary to carry out the legislative purposes.1 "
However, the Act's provisions often proved contradictory and unfair.
For example, the Act authorized the Secretary of Interior "to issue or cause
to be issued permits to graze livestock on such grazing districts to such bona
fide settlers, residents, and other stock owners .. ".."19 This gave
preferential permit rights to landowners engaged in the livestock business
or owners of water rights. These landowners were then able to develop a
monopoly on the grazing benefits.2 0 Also, as amended in 1939, the Act set
up a unique system of direct advisory boards. 1 The advisory boards,
composed primarily of stockmen,22 reviewed all grazing permit applica-
tions and gave advice and made range use and management recommenda-
tions to the BLM.2 a This system effectively excluded other members of the
public from participation in range management decisions, resulting in a
denial of the general public's right to use the nation's natural resources.
Because the Act granted preferential rights and an exclusive par-
ticipatory role to one class of users,"' the Act proved inadequate for
effective rangeland management. However, the Taylor Grazing Act
represented an enormous advance over the destructive days of unregulated,
free and open grazing. Congress, by exercising its control over the federal
public rangelands, placed the federal government in a role as protector and
manager of the land. Further, the Act set the tone and course for all
subsequent federal public rangeland management.
B. Federal Land Policy and Management Act
By the 1970's, the poor condition of the federal public rangelands
evidenced the BLM's failure to achieve one of the principal goals of the
Taylor Grazing Act-to improve range conditions or at a minimum to stop
injury to the federal public lands by preventing overgrazing and soil
deterioration.25 A report by the Public Land Law Review Commission
17. Id. § 315.
18. Id. § 315a.
19. Id. § 315b.
20. Coggins, supra note 10, at 49.
21. 43 U.S.C. § 315o-1.
22. Id. § 315o-l(a).
23. Id. § 315o-l(b).
24. Coggins, supra note 10, at 49.
25. 43 U.S.C. § 315a. In 1975, a BLM report to the Senate Appropriations Committee
concluded that much of the 170 million acres of federal public rangeland was in poor and declining
condition. The BLM found "only 2 percent of the rangeland in excellent condition; 28 percent was in
poor condition; and 5 percent in bad condition." Furthermore, the report stated that "sixteen percent of
the range continues to deteriorate." 124 Cong. Rec. S32805 (1978) (statement of Sen. Church).
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(PLLRC) 6 in 1970 directed some public attention toward the rangeland
problems, and recommended greater administrative flexibility and more
attention to wildlife.27 Congress finally acted on the PLLRC recommenda-
tions in 1976. At that time, Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA)28 which reasserted the compelling need to
improve the federal public rangeland by emphasizing resource protection.
During the House debates on FLPMA, representatives expressed
concern that " [t] he grazing lands of the West are being grazed out,' 2 9 and
emphasized the vital need "to prevent overgrazing and halt the deteriora-
tion of public grazing lands."30 In response to these concerns, former
Montana Representative John Melcher assured Congress that "the re-
sponsibility of cancelling or modifying a lease if there is overgrazing is
inherent with the Secretary of the Interior. .. and we do not disturb that"
in FLPMA. 1
FLPMA is a comprehensive statement of the public policy command-
ing efficient resource use and public rangeland improvement. In FLPMA,
Congress implicitly denounces BLM's past practices by finding a substan-
tial amount of the federal public rangeland deteriorating in quality but
recognizes that installation of additional rangeland improvements could
arrest much of the continuing deterioration. 2 Congress directs the BLM to
effectively manage the public lands in FLPMA through a systematic
inventory of rangelands, a land use planning process and the protection of
certain lands in their natural condition."3
Congress did not repeal the provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act when
enacting FLPMA. Rather, Congress added a new management structure
with emphases on mandatory land use planning," and multiple use and
sustained yield principles. 5 Congress borrowed much of the language in
FLPMA regarding multiple use, sustained yield from the 1960 legislation
applicable to the Forest Service's management of the national forests- the
26. In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Public Law 88-606, creating the Public Land
Law Review Commission. The Commission was formed to review all of the public land laws, as well as
the rules and regulations promulgated under those laws, to determine whether the law needed to be
revised. E. BAYNARD, II1, PUBLIC LAND LAW & PROCEDURE 13 (1986).
27. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION's LAND (1970).
28. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782.
29. 122 Cong. Rec. 23459 (1976) (statement of Rep. Yates).
30. Id. at 23462 (statement of Rep. Eckhardt).
31. Id. (statement of Rep. Melcher). Mr. Melcher is currently a United States Senator for the
state of Montana.
32. 43 U.S.C. § 1751(b)(1).
33. Id.
34. Id. §§ 1711-1712.
35. Id. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1702(c), 1702(h), 1732(a).
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Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA).38 However, in MUSYA
Congress directs the Secretary of Agriculture in only general, nonmanda-
tory language to administer the five primary uses of the national forests
37
and to give "due consideration" to relative resource values.38
While the basic command of FLPMA is similar to MUSYA,
FLPMA's language differs by being replete with management directives in
mandatory language. The Secretary of Interior shall inventory,39 shall
prepare land use plans, 40 shall give priority to areas of critical environmen-
tal concern,"' and shall prevent undue degradation of the lands.42 Further,
FLPMA's basic command requires that the Secretary of Interior manage
the land "in accordance with the land-use plan,"'43 binding the Secretary of
Interior and the agency to a rational, coordinated management scheme.
FLPMA also contains substantive mandates on managerial discre-
tion. Section 1702(c) states that management cannot cause "permanent
impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the
environment"4 4 and consideration must be given to the relative values of
the resource. 5 The nonimpairment standard is nondiscretionary. Congress
clearly requires that management practices do not detract from future
productivity. A second mandate found in FLPMA provides that the
Secretary of Interior shall take action necessary to prevent unnecessary or
undue degradation of the land.' Again, the statute reflects Congress'
overall aim of mandatory range improvement.
While FLPMA is a great advance over the Taylor Grazing Act,
Congress failed to resolve adequately basic management conflicts or
translate underlying principles into binding commands.' 7 For instance,
Congress failed to ensure that the planning process would be implemented
fully and neglected to define precise standards.4 Two years later, Congress
again tackled the problem with the enactment of the Public Rangelands
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982).
37. The five primary uses of the national forests are outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, wildlife and fish purposes. These uses were declared supplemental to and not in derrogation
of the original purposes of the national forests as declared in the Organic Act. Id. § 528.
38. Id. § 529.
39. 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a).
40. Id. § 1712(a).
41. Id. § 1712(c)(3).
42. Id. § 1732(b).
43. Id. § 1732(a).
44. Id. § 1702(c).
45. id.
46. Id.§ 1732(b).
47. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management V Prescriptions for Reform, 14
ENVTL. L. 497, 505 (1984).
48. Id.
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Improvement Act (PRIA)49 in 1978. PRIA included a number of innova-
tive programs,50 yet PRIA's biggest contribution is its embodiment of
Congress' explicit directive that range condition improvement be the
highest management priority."
C. Public Rangelands Improvement Act
During Senate considerations of PRIA, Congress once again stated its
desire to build upon past efforts and recognized PRIA as a step toward the
preservation and restoration of the federal public rangelands.52 Recogniz-
ing that considerable portions of the public rangelands remain in unsatis-
factory condition, Congress stated that the condition should be corrected
with intensive maintenance, management and improvement programs.53
Section 1903(b) is undoubtedly the most important provision of
PRIA. In this section Congress explicitly makes range improvement the
primary goal of range management programs by directing the Secretary of
Interior to manage the public rangelands so that "the goal of such
management shall be to improve the range conditions of the public
rangelands so that they become as productive as feasible"5 in accordance
with the objectives stated in the land use plans.
Although the conclusions stated by Congress were unexceptional and
clearly evident prior to PRIA, PRIA reaffirms Congressional concern.
Further, the policies enunciated in Section 1901(b) define the ends that
Congress intends to achieve, 55 and provides a basis for judicial review of the
49. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908.
50. For example, Section 1908 enunciates an Experimental Stewardship Program authorizing
the Secretary of the Interior to explore innovative grazing management policies and systems which
might provide incentives to improve range conditions.
51. 43 U.S.C. § 1903(b).
52. Congress recognized that considerable portions of the rangelands are in unsatisfactory
condition and will remain so unless a co-ordinated effort is undertaken to improve and then properly
manage these federal public rangelands. Id. § 1901(a).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1903(b).
55. The statute provides:
The Congress therefore hereby establishes and reaffirms a national policy and commitment
to:
(I) inventory and identify current public rangelands conditions and trends as a part of the
inventory process... ;
(2) manage, maintain and improve the condition of the public rangelands so that they
become as productive as feasible for all rangeland values in accordance with management
objectives and the land use planning process .. .;
(3) charge a fee for public grazing use which is equitable and reflects the [potential
economic disruption and harm to the western livestock industry] ...;
(4) continue the policy of protecting wild free-roaming horses and burros from capture,
branding, harassment, or death, while at the same time facilitating the removal and disposal
of excess wild free-roaming horses and burros which pose a threat to themselves and their
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BLM's land use plans. All land use plans implemented by the BLM must
parallel the policies enunciated by Congress.
Throughout PRIA, Congress established a single management prior-
ity-to improve unconditionally the condition on the rangelands. The
courts, in turn, must review an agency's decision in light of the applicable
statutes which embody Congressional findings, policies and underlying
Congressional urgency to improve the federal public rangelands.
III. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL V. HODEL
A. Factual and Legal History
The Reno, Nevada watershed is of significant value to the surrounding
community, containing rivers, streams and other water bodies which are
sources of scarce western water supplies."' The watershed provides a
habitat for large number of wildlife and supports many varied forms of
vegetation. 57 Improper and excessive livestock grazing has resulted in the
destruction of critical wildlife habitat, reduced the capacity of the soils to
absorb and retain water and increased soil erosion due to altered plant
cover. 8 These problems were at the core of the issues raised in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Hodel.59
In Hodel, a Nevada federal district court decision, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC)60 sought to overturn a decision made
by the BLM relating to livestock grazing on public lands in the Reno area.
Rather than immediately reducing livestock numbers, the BLM chose to
install range improvement methods such as protective fences, water
storage and development, and seeding and vegetation manipulation. 1
While the BLM's land use plan called for an overall improvement in the
quality of some of the allotments, the BLM chose to maintain existing
levels of livestock use.02
The NRDC challenged the BLM's actions on a number of grounds.
First, the NRDC claimed the grazing environmental impact statement
habitat and to other rangeland values;
Id. § 1901(b).
56. Affidavit of William R. Meiners, Environmental Consultant specializing in resource
management and land use planning, 4-5 (March 30, 1985) (obtained from the Natural Resources
Defense Council, San Francisco, California).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 4.
59. 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985).
60. Plaintiffs in this case included the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Sierra Club,
and the Nevada Outdoor Recreation Association, Inc.
61. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1057.
62. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12, 624 F. Supp. 1045 [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum].
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(EIS) prepared by the BLM lacked the information and analysis necessary
to allow reasoned decisionmaking and informed public participation,
contrary to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).63 Second, the BLM's failure to take drastic and immediate
actions to prevent overgrazing and unnecessary environmental degrada-
tion was contrary to the mandates of FLPMA and PRIA as well as the
agency's own regulations.64 Third, contrary to the planning requirements
of FLPMA, PRIA and applicable regulations, the final land use plan, or
management framework plan (MFP), failed to establish the basic terms
and objectives for future livestock grazing.65
The court rejected the NRDC's contentions. Although noting that
many of the complaints raised had factual merit suggesting either bad
management or an insensitivity to environmental concerns,66 the court
concluded that the complaints did not give rise to a cause of action. The
court reasoned that to conclude otherwise would "ultimately require this
court to adopt the opinion of one expert over that of another, or to adopt one
theory of range management over another. '6 7 Consequently, the court
granted summary judgment to the BLM."8 This casenote addresses
NRDC's second and third contentions, alleging violations by the BLM of
the federal rangeland statutes and applicable regulations.
B. Analysis
The NRDC first contended that the BLM's land use plan conflicted
with statutory Congressional mandates and BLM regulations by failing to
curb overgrazing and take the affirmative steps necessary to remedy past
degradation of the federal public rangelands.69 The NRDC relied upon the
federal statutes which, as highlighted earlier, all emphasize the protection
of the rangeland resources and the prevention of injury caused by
overgrazing. Likewise, the NRDC noted the BLM regulations which
expressly state that "authorized livestock grazing use shall not exceed the
"170livestock grazing capacity . ...
Yet the final EIS revealed substantial environmental problems and
resource conflicts caused by excessive and improper livestock grazing. The
draft EIS, prepared by the BLM and substantially adopted in the final EIS,
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 [codified as amended]; Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1049.
64. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1056.
65. Id. at 1058.
66. Id. at 1047.
67. Id. at 1048.
68. Id. at 1063.
69. Id. at 1056.
70. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.6-1(a)(1986).
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acknowledged that "[o]verutilization is occurring in 15 allotments,' '7 1 and
such overutilization and overgrazing by livestock resulted in deterioration
of critically important riparian sites, meadow areas and mule deer
habitat.72 Further, "improper" range management practices such as year-
round grazing and grazing too early in the season also caused serious harm
to the rangelands, particularly in vital riparian and aspen communities.73
These EIS documents also revealed that improvement would not occur
until excessive grazing and other improper grazing practices were
changed.74
Despite the overwhelming evidence in the BLM's own studies of the
serious environmental damage resulting from livestock mismanagement
and the recognition that reductions in livestock grazing use were clearly
necessary, the BLM's land use plan did not recommend specific reductions
in grazing use. Rather, the BLM proposed minimal range improvements,
such as forage improvements, 75 and deferred adjustments in levels of
permitted livestock grazing until more accurate monitoring data was
accumulated.76 The BLM also justified its decision by pointing out that the
No Action alternative was within the statutory discretion of the agency. 7
However, by accepting the No Action alternative, the BLM ignored its
statutory and regulatory duties mandating range improvement through
the elimination of overgrazing.
Second, the NRDC alleged the final land use plan failed to establish
the basic terms and objectives for future livestock grazing necessary to
fulfill the planning requirements of the federal rangeland statutes and
BLM regulations.7 a The NRDC stated that one of FLPMA's basic ideas,
reaffirmed in PRIA, mandated the development, maintenance and revision
of comprehensive land use plans governing public rangeland management
to improve federal public rangelands.7 9 The BLM regulations promul-
gated to implement the statutes state that land use plans "are designed to
guide and control future management actions."80 To achieve this end, the
71. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 51, Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045 [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum] (quoting Bureau of
Land Management, Reno Grazing Draft Environmental Impact Statement at 3-9 (July 12, 1982)
[hereinafter Draft EIS]).
72. Id. (citing Draft EIS at 2-6, 2-13).
73. Id. at 13 (citing Draft EIS at 2-1, 2-6, 2-9, 2-13, 2-14, 3-9, 3-10).
74. Id. at 47.
75. Forage improvements in the short term include installing protective fences, seeding and
developing water supplies. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1057.
76. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 62, at 49-50.
77. Id. at 49.
78. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1058-59.
79. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1712, 1732(a), 1901(b)(2), 1903(b).
80. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-2.
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plans must contain specific provisions which establish allowable resource
uses and related levels of production or use, goals and objectives to be
attained, program constraints and any support action necessary to achieve
the stated objectives. 81
The proposals stated in the final land use plan are vague and do not
contain the specific terms and conditions necessary to satisfy the planning
requirements. For example, in an effort to protect areas of fisheries and
riparian habitat from overutilization by domestic livestock, the planned
action included "special management considerations."82 While the draft
EIS refers generally to "certain management actions. . . necessary to
correct [existing resource] problems," ' those actions are never specified in
the final land use plan. As such, these vague proposals do not represent a
plan that follows the statutory mandates, but instead allows the BLM
unfettered discretion in future management decisions.
The BLM argued that the land use planning requirements of the
statute only demanded broad statements of purpose and the inclusion of
extensive and detailed information in the land use plan. Agreeing with the
BLM, the court stated that the regulations and statutes insisted upon
objective oriented statements in the plan; the plan had to be concrete
enough to permit Congress and the public to know what the BLM intended
to do with the grazing lands, what improvements were needed, and a rough
timetable for their implementation. 4 Any more specific information, the
court stated, would be an "administrative straight-jacket which eliminates
the room for any flexibility to meet changing conditions."85 Although the
court must avoid any controversies amounting to a choice between
experts,' the court cannot accept an agency's proposed action based solely
upon an agency's unfettered discretion. As highlighted earlier in FLPMA
and PRIA, Congress clearly evidenced their intent to mandate immediate
and aggressive rangeland improvement programs. The BLM's recognition
of range deterioration resulting primarily from overgrazing, coupled with
its refusal to act aggressively toward a remedy for the problem, presents a
situation clearly addressed in the federal range statutes. The court must
review the action to determine whether it complies with the Congressional
mandates.
While the above facts warrant close judicial scrutiny of the BLM's
land use plan, the following precedent also warrants such scrutiny. In
81. Id. § 1601.0-5(k).
82. Bureau of Land Management, Management Framework Plan 359 (March 5, 1982).
83. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 71, at 24 (quoting Draft EIS at 1-1).
84. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1060.
85. Id.
86. Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1979).
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American Motorcyclist Association v. Watt (I) & (II),s  two California
federal district court decisions, the courts reviewed an agency action under
FLPMA § 1781.88 Section 1781 requires the BLM to prepare land use
plans for the California Desert Conservation Area (CDCA) premised on
multiple use and an emphasis on protecting the CDCA's natural resources.
The CDCA had been used increasingly for off-road vehicle (ORV)
recreation and potentially threatened the natural resources found in the
CDCA. Upon completion of the land use plan, various plaintiffs challenged
the proposal.8 9
The court in American Motorcyclist Association (I) discussed plain-
tiffs' claims against the BLM on procedural grounds. 90 In American
Motorcyclist Association (II), the federal district court addressed the
substantive requirements of BLM planning. The CDCA plan stated that
ORV use could be restricted to "Class L" areas and set out criteria by
which "Class L" areas would be determined. 91 Plaintiffs claimed that the
route approval criteria for Class L areas found in the agency's plan were
inconsistent with BLM regulations. The regulations demanded that route
designation shall be based on the protection of the resources of the public
lands, the promotion of the safety of all users, and the minimization of
conflicts and environmental damage.92 In contrast, the challenged criteria
contained in the proposed plan simply posed the question of whether the
route would cause considerable adverse impacts.93 The court found that
although the criteria was neutrally phrased, the criteria did not explicitly
prohibit route designation in any defined situation. 94 "The 'considerable
adverse impacts' standard is qualitatively different than the minimization
criteria mandated . . . and in practice is almost certain to skew route
designation decision-making in favor of ORV use."95 Viewed as a whole,
the court concluded that the land use plan would very likely result in a route
selection process which did not comply in significant respects with the
express standards set out in the regulations. 6 Reviewing the legislative
history of the statutes, the explicit language of the statutes, and the BLM's
regulations, the court determined that Congress had clearly spoken in the
87. American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt (1), 534 F. Supp. 923 (C.D. Cal. 1981), American
Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt (11), 543 F. Supp. 789 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
88. 43 U.S.C. § 1781.
89. Plaintiffs included Inyo County, environmental groups, off-road vehicle (ORV) associations
and governmental units.
90. American Motorcyclist Ass'n (1), 534 F. Supp. at 924.
91. American Motorcyclist Assn (11), 543 F. Supp. at 797.
92. See 43 C.F.R. § 8342.1.
93. American Motorcyclist Assn (I), 543 F. Supp. at 797.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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situation warranting the court's active role.
Yet the court in Hodel glossed over the clear intent expressed in
FLPMA and PRIA and completely ignored the regulations implementing
those statutes. Rather than reviewing the land use plan to determine
whether it was contrary to such statutory and regulatory requirements, and
therefore "not in accordance with the law,' 97 the court found the statutes
not sufficiently specific to limit clearly agency discretion. Even though the
proposed actions were not aggressive or immediate, absent a more clear
statutory limit on agency discretion, the court would not disturb the plan.98
As in Perkins v. Bergland,99 the court in Hodel limited its review of
the BLM's decision to whether the land use plan was "arbitrary, capricious
or contrary to law." 100 However, strict adherence to the analysis found in
Perkins was inappropriate. In Perkins, two grazing permittees challenged
the Forest Service's decision regarding the appropriate grazing levels on
their allotments.101 The permittees argued that the Multiple-Use, Sus-
tained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA) 1°0 provided standards for judicial
review. The court rejected the permittees' contentions and concluded that
in cases in which the relevant statutes contained vague directives, only a
limited review was appropriate. The court presumed proper review of an
agency decision and stated:
These sections of MUSYA (16 U.S.C. §§ 528, 529, 531) contain
the most general clauses and phrases.. . . This language, [due
consideration be given to the relative values of the various
resource] partially defined in Section 531 in such terms as 'that
[which] will best meet the needs of the American people' and
'making the most judicious use of the land', can hardly be
considered concrete limits upon agency discretion. Rather, it is
language which 'breathe[s] discretion at every pore.'10s
The court in Perkins looked to MUSYA to determine the amount of
discretion granted an agency whereas the court in Hodel interpreted
FLPMA and PRIA. MUSYA is a far more general statute than FLPMA
and does not contain the express, mandatory directive embodied in
FLPMA.10 4 PRIA is an extension of FLPMA which reaffirms Congres-
sional concern and explicitly states that range condition improvement is
97. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
98. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1058.
99. 608 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1979).
100. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1058 (quoting the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A)).
101. Perkins, 608 F.2d at 804.
102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531.
103. Perkins, 608 F.2d at 806 (citations omitted).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
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the highest management priority'0 5 and provides the device for funding
such improvements. 06 Together FLPMA and PRIA represent a clear
Congressional policy toward range improvement as the primary manage-
ment goal. These statutes provide a clear limit on agency discretion.
Further, the regulations implementing the statutes prohibit overgraz-
ing of livestock.107 One of the objectives of the regulations is to enhance the
productivity of the public rangelands by preventing overgrazing and soil
deterioration. 10 8 The regulations are clear and unambiguous, yet the court
did not carefully review the regulations to determine if the BLM's actions
accorded with the regulations. The BLM admitted the overgrazing
problem in its own documents and stated that the resource damage would
continue unless excessive grazing and other improper current practices
were changed.109 Despite the widespread problem, the BLM did not
implement immediate steps to remedy the overgrazing. This condition of
the current practices and the resulting damage constitutes a violation of the
BLM's statutory and regulatory duties. The court did not apply the facts to
the law and thus erroneously determined that the plan was in accordance
with the law.
The regulations also state that land use plans "are designed to guide
and control future management actions."" However, the BLM did not
allocate forage. Nor did the plan contain objectives and constraints that
would control future range decisionmaking. The BLM argued that the
specifics would be set at the permit decision stage and that the land use
plans address broader issues. The court agreed, stating that the broad,
objective oriented statements seemed to be the proper material for a land
use plan. The conclusion ignores the clear language of the statutes and
regulations and instead allows the BLM to avoid any specific limitations on
future uses. The vague, generalized "plan" does not meet the statutory
requirements and allows the agency unfettered discretion to manage
livestock grazing use on federal public lands.
V. CONCLUSION
Although recognizing that an aggressive approach to range improve-
ment "might be closer to what Congress had in mind,""' the Nevada
105. 43 U.S.C. § 1903(b).
106. Id. § 1904.
107. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4130.6-1(a), 4100.0-2.
108. 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-2.
109. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 71, at 13 (citing Draft EIS at 2-1,2-6,2-9,2-13,2-14,
3-9, 3-10).
110. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-2.
Ill. In a brief opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision in Hodel. Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit did not address the pertinent question of
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federal district court in Hodel hid behind deference to agency manage-
ment decisions. Yet the question addressed in Hodel did not involve a
choice between one theory of range management against another. Rather,
the Hodel decision addresses questions of statutory interpretation and
agency noncompliance. The court neglected its duty by failing to follow
Congressional mandates embodied in FLMPA and PRIA.112 Conse-
quently, the court in Hodel, as well as other courts, must reverse a land use
plan if the agency fails to follow relevant substantive standards.
American Motorcyclist Association (1) & (II), as well as other
decisions in the field, 113 evidence a judicial willingness to review an
agency's land use plans. These courts have reviewed the agency's proposed
action and determined its validity through an interpretation of the spirit
and letter of the statutes and regulations. These cases represent a positive
step toward an active judicial role in agency planning that will undoubtedly
result in more rational, co-ordinated management plans and ensure agency
compliance with the Congressional mandates.
whether the BLM violated substantive statutory requirements.
112. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1058.
113. See, e.g., Valdez v. Applegate, 616 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1980); Hinsdale Livestock Co. v.
United States, 501 F. Supp. 773 (D. Mont. 1980).
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